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THE MUSLIM PERSPECTIVE ON THE
CLERGY-PENITENT PRIVILEGE
Azizah al-Hibri*
I.

INTRODUCrION

Before Jones confesses his crimes to Imam Ahmad, he should be
clear on the duties and role of the imam of a mosque. The imam's
duties usually consist of leading prayers and providing advice and
assistance to those in the community who seek them. Imams are
chosen for their knowledge in matters of religion. It is possible,
however, that the community has more knowledgeable persons within
it who are not interested in the position of imam. In such cases, when
a more knowledgeable person visits the mosque, the Muslims present
at that time, including the imam, may choose that visitor to lead the
prayers.
The absence of a hierarchical clerical structure in Islam makes it
possible for every Muslim to have a voice in religious debates on
issues about which they are knowledgeable. In fact, if they are
* Azizah al-Hibri is an Associate Professor of Law and the Allen Professor of Law
for 1996 to 1997 at the T.C. Williams School of Law, University of Richmond. In addition
to her Juris Doctor degree, Professor al-Hibri holds a Ph.D., Master's and Bachelor's
degree in Philosophy. Professor al-Hibri writes and speaks extensively on Islamic
jurisprudence, American and Islamic comparative legal theory, family law, woman's rights,
and ethics. The author thanks Dr. Fathi Osman, Islamic Center of Southern California,
for his insights in a discussion of this hypothetical. The author also thanks Dr. Jamal
Badawi, Islamic Information Foundation (Canada), for his comments on an earlier draft
of this Essay.
t This Essay contains citations to Arabic Islamic sources which are not available in
English. For these sources, the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review relied entirely upon
Professor al-Hibri's translation and interpretation. Professor al-Hibri is a native speaker
of Arabic and has studied the Qur'an throughout her life. She regularly revises loose
translations which alter the basic meaning of Quranic passages, and recently contested
certain Arabic interpretations of Quranic words as patriarchal. See Azizah al-Hibri,
Mashrou' Bahth NaqdiLi Qawaninal-Ahwal al-Shakhsiyah FiBuldan ArabiahMukhtarah
(Critque of PersonalStatus Codes in Selected Arab Countries) published in Arabic by
ESCWA, United Nations, as part of the background papers for the regional conference
held in Jordan, 1994, in preparation for the Fourth World Conference on Women, held in
Beijing, 1995. Copies of the sources are on file with the Loyola of Los Angeles Law
Review.

1723

1724

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29:1723

sufficiently knowledgeable, they may even engage in ijtihad.' A
popular story in Islamic literature recounts that Khalifah (Caliph)
'Umar gave a speech in a mosque suggesting that a ceiling be placed
on the amount of mahr2 women were demanding at that time. An
old woman stood up and disagreed vehemently, saying, "You shall not
take away from us what God has given us." She then cited a passage
stood corrected, saying,
from the Qur'an to prove her point. 'Umar
3
wrong."
is
'Umar
and
right
is
woman
"A
The name of this woman was never mentioned in any of the
books, indicating that she was not well-known-or powerful-in her
community. Furthermore, it is very unlikely that her overall religious
knowledge was superior to that of the Khalifah. Still, she was
sufficiently knowledgeable on the issue of mahr to show him his error.
Recognizing that error, 'Umar readily backed away from his proposed
law, despite being the leader of all Muslims. This story clearly
illustrates the absence of a centralized spiritual authority in Islam
having the sole power to interpret the religious text, and the right of
each Muslim to enter religious debates on matters about which they
are knowledgeable. Incidentally, every Muslim, whether male or
female, has the unrestricted right, indeed duty, to pursue knowledge,
including religious knowledge.
Thus, imams cannot and do not derive their legitimacy from any
centralized spiritual authority. Like other Muslims, they derive both
their legitimacy and moral authority from the community's recognition
of the quality and extent of their religious knowledge.4 Consequently, their role tends to be advisory and consultative. So, Jones should
not expect the imam to have any special powers, duties, or responsi-

1. Iftihad is jurisprudential activity involving the interpretation of the Qur'an, the
hadith, and various secondary religious sources.
2. Mahr has been improperly translated as dowry. In fact, it is a sum of money

specified by a woman and accepted for payment by her prospective husband as partial
consideration for the woman's entry into marriage. It is the full property of the woman
and may be due immediately, in part or in full, or at a later specified date or upon divorce
or the death of the husband. As such, it is a financial safety net for the woman. If not
paid, it constitutes a senior debt against the husband's estate and is different from the
inheritance share the wife receives.
3. 1 A. AL-GHAZALI, 'IHYA' 'ULUM AD-DEEN [THE REVIVAL OF RELIGIOUS
STUDIES] 50 (11 Century, reprint, Cairo, 1939); IBN MAJAH, SUNAN [NORMS] 81 (6

Century, reprint, 1939). See also a reference to this incident in Azizah al-Hibri, Islamic
Constitutionalismand the Concept of Democracy, 24 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 25 (1992).

4. There have been historical exceptions, but these involve oppressive worldly
authorities imposing on the community imams holding favored views.
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bilities towards him. The imam is simply 'another member of the
community who can give sound religious advice.
II.

CONFIDENTIALITY

Muslims are required to treat other people's confidences with
the utmost respect. Prophet Muhammad calls such confidences
"trust[s]." 5 On one occasion the Prophet mentioned six qualities that
would help a person enter Paradise. Keeping a trust was among
them.6 These Prophetic hadiths-or ahadith, statements-shed light
on the Qur'anicinjunction which says: "0 ye that believe! Betray
not the trust of God, and the Messenger, and do not betray your
trusts knowingly."7 In two other places, the Qur'an defines believers
in identical language, saying that they are those "who faithfully
observe (respect) their trusts and their covenants. '
Thus, observing the relationship of trust is very important in
Islam, and it is the duty of every Muslim. Consequently, the imam,
like other Muslims, is subject to this general confidentiality requirement. It is possible to argue, however, that as a knowledgeable
individual who has a deeper understanding of the religion, the imam
ought to be held, perhaps, to a higher standard of compliance.
Additionally, many jurists have argued that it is desirable for
Muslims not to publicize the bad deeds of others committed in
private. This is referred to as the duty of sitr.9 For example, if a

5. 3 AL-GHAZALI, supra note 3, at 129.
6. l at 132.
7. QUR'AN 8:27. The translation used herein is that entitled The Holy Qur'an:
English Translation of the Meanings and Commentary, published by the Saudi Arabian
Ministry of Hajj and Endowments (1410 A.H./1990 A.D.). The author modified the
translation wherever it was necessary to improve the accuracy of meaning. The Meanings
and Commentary translates the last part of the verse referred to here as "Nor misappropriate knowingly things entrusted to you." The translation provided in this Essay is closer
to the Arabic original which does not contain the Arabic word for "missappropriate." The
actual word used is "takhunu" which derives from the Arabic word "khan," meaning "to
betray." "Allah," the Arabic word for "God," was replaced with the corresponding
English word "God."
8. Il at 23:8, 70:32.
9. A. BAHNASI, As-SIYASAH AL-JINA'IYAH FI AL-SHARI'AH AL-ISLAMIYAH [POLICY

ON CRIMINAL MATTERS IN ISLAMIC LAW] 370 (Cairo 1983) [hereinafter BAHNASI,
CRIMINAL MATTERS]; see also M. ABU ZAHRAH, AL'UQUBAH [THE PUNISHMENT] 48-49

(Cairo n.d.) (classifying wrongs or crimes into two categories:

those that can be

established without spying on individuals and violating their privacy-which is protected
by shir, and those that cannot; and referring to the Qur'anic injunction not to spy on

others, suspect them, or gossip about them).
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Muslim man drinks alchohol in the privacy of his home-avoiding
public display of his acts-and another Muslim inadvertently learns
about his drinking, it is recommended that he refrain from publicizing
it. Several jurists regard such violations as a private matter that
concerns the relationship of the violator with his God." Such jurists
would also argue, however, that the person possessing the information
should, if at all possible, help the violator overcome his shortcom1
ings. 1
At first blush the confidentiality requirement would work to
protect Jones, so he should now be willing to share his confidences
with the imam. But in fact, the imam has other considerations to take
into account. There is more to the situation than the confidentiality
requirement alone. There is the fact that Jones caused a grievous
harm to two other human beings, the murder victim and Smith, to the
whole community, and to humanity at large. He has killed a soul, and
the Qur'an says that killing a soul unjustly is like killing all humans. 2 Thus, the confidence that Jones wants to share with imam
Ahmad is of a different order than one pertaining to victimiless crimes
or crimes involving marital or financial troubles. Moreover, the
obligation not to embarass another by publicizing his misdeeds is not
absolute. For example, it may be overridden if the misdeed is not
victimless or if the perpetrator has publicized it himself.13

III. KILLING
We cannot appreciate the dilemma facing imam Ahmad without
first understanding the gravity of taking another person's life, and the
different rights that are violated, under Islamic law. The taking of life
is viewed as a dual violation of God's rights-which concern the
public interest, or maslaha, of his creatures-and human rights.1 4 In

10. BAHNASI, CRIMINAL MATrERS, supra note 9, at 370-71.

11. This obligation derives from the Qur'anic passage which states, "Let there arise
out of you a group of people inviting to all that is good, enjoining what is right and
forbidding what is wrong." QUR'AN, supra note 7, at 3:104.
12. Id. at 5:32.
13. BAHNASI, CRIMINAL MATTERS, supra note 9, at 371-73.

14. M. ABU ZAHRAH, supra note 9, at 56-57, 62,72, 474; see also 1 A. AWDAH, ALTASHRI' AL-JINA'I AL-ISLAMI [ISLAMIC CRIMINAL LAW] 81 (Cairo n.d.) (noting that the
state may not preempt the victim-or the victim's family-in granting forgiveness for
crimes of qisas; and noting that the victim-or the victim's family-and the state each has
a separate right to forgive, but the forgiveness of the state may not adversely affect the
victim's rights-or those of the family-which are primary); A. BAHNASI, SHARH \VA
TA'LIQ

'ALA

RISALAT

AL-MARHOUM

AL-SHEIKH

MAHMOUD

SHALTUT

F

AL-
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what follows, I will focus on the crime of intentional killing since it is
the main concern of this hypothetical. Unintentional killing is treated
much less severely in Islamic jurisprudence. The discussion will
proceed in stages, describing various elements in the Qur'anic
treatment of intentional killing, ranging from execution to forgiveness.
The Qur'anstates that killing a single soul unjustly is tantamount
to killing the whole of humanity, 5 and that an unjustified killing
deserves death as qisas.6 Qisas is a punishment best understood in
the West through the biblical concept of "an eye for an eye.' 17 Abu
Zahrah, a modern Egyptian scholar, argues that the purpose of the
punishment of qisas is the preservation of life.' This argument
relies on the Qur'anicverse which addresses those who "understand,"
saying that "there is life in qisas."'9 Abu Zahrah understands that

verse in a way that many other Muslim scholars have, namely, that
the murderer's execution has the long-term effect of preserving the
life of the community.' Of course, no punishment will be meted out
unless due process is observed at trial and extenuating circumstances
are absent.2 ' Furthermore, in the case of an unintentional killing,
punishment differs significantly and usually consists of simply paying
damages-diyah-to the victim's family.2
Despite the grave adverse effects murder has on society as a
whole, the Qur'antreats the particular interests of the murder victim
as paramount in this world. After all, the victim suffers the most
direct and egregious effects of the murder. His family is, therefore,
MAS'ULIYAH AL-JINA'IYAH [EXPLANATION AND COMMENTARY ON THE THESIS OF THE
LATE SHEIK MAHMOUD SHALTUT ON CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY] 155 (Cairo 1987)
[hereinafter BAHNASI, EXPLANATION] (stating that by providing separate rights to punish

or forgive a killer, to the victim-and the victim's family-and the State, the Law Giver
clearly desired to bring attention to the fact that killing is grave and concerns both the
victim-and the victim's family-and the security of society as a whole).
15. QUR'AN, supra note 7, at 5:32.
16. ld. at 2:178.
17. The Qur'anmentions this biblical rule in 5:45.
18. ABU ZAHRAH, supra note 9, at 300-02.
19. QUR'AN, supra note 7, at 2:179.
20. ABU ZAHRAH, supra note 9, at 301; see also 5 A. AL-JAZIRI, KITAB AL-FIQH 'ALA
AL-MATHAHIB AL-ARBA'AH [THE BOOK OF ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE BASED ON THE

FOUR SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT] 260-61 (Beirut 1986) (arguing that the objective of qisas
is saving lives, ending aggression on human lives, and fostering peace and security in the
community). Note that qisas is translated sometimes as the "Law of Equality."
21. ABU ZAHRAH, supra note 9, at 368-69, 453-54; 1 AWDAH, supra note 14, at 82;
BAHNASI, EXPLANATION, supra note 14, at 107-11.
22. QU'RAN, supra note 7, at 4:92. See discussion on this point in 5 AL-JAZIRI, supra
note 20, at 276.
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given the right to seek the punishment of qisas against the murderer
in court. The family alone has standing to demand qisas in the courts.
If it does not, the state has standing to bring the case to court on its
own initiative. But the state may not demand qisas as punishment.
It may demand, however, some other-usually significantly lesser-form of punishment. This fact indicates that while public maslaha
is also affected by the commission of a murder, it is comparatively
secondary to the family's interest.2?
But the God who gives the victim's family the right to demand
qisasfrom the courts is also the God who urges forgiveness. So, while
the Qur'an specifies death as the appropriate qisas for intentional
24
killing, it also urges the victim's family to forego qisas and forgive.
Forgiveness is repeatedly described by the Qur'an as better than
revenge or punishment.' Indeed, those who forgive earn a reward
from God.26
Forgiveness, a difficult act under most circumstances, is particularly encouraged in the case of intentional murder. This is suggested
by the expanded window of opportunity available to the victim's
family to forgive. Unlike other types of crime under Islamic law, the
victim's family continues to have the opportunity to forgive the killer
even after the court system becomes involved in the case.27 If the
family decides to forgive, and the state takes no further action, then
the murderer is free to go into this world but still must face God in
the afterlife.' The afterlife punishment for unjustified killing is that
of eternal Hell. 29 However, there are verses in the Qur'an which

suggest that God the All-Merciful may forgive even a killer.30 Thus,
repentance by the murderer is encouraged regardless of any wordly
23. QUR'AN, supra note 7, at 17:33; see also discussion in 5 AL-JAZIRI, supra note 20,
at 262 (arguing that giving the victim's family the right to choose the punishment once the
accused is found guilty helps the family deal with its grief and eliminates the possibility
that its members will take the law into their own hands).
24. QUR'AN, supra note 7, at 2:178,42:40; see also 5 AL-JAZIRI, supra note 20, at 258.
59 (discussing forgiveness).
25. QUR'AN, supra note 7, at 42:40.
26. Ld. at 5:45; 2 AWDAH, supra note 14, at 157; BAHNASI, EXPLANATION, supra note
14, at 183.
27. 5 AL-JAZIRI, supra note 20, at 5-6, 258; BAHNASI, EXPLANATION, supra note 14,

at 155.
28. 5

AL-JAZIRI,

supra note 20, at 258; see also 1

AWDAH,

supra note 14, at 245

(stating the view of the majority of jurists that unless required by public interest, ta'zir
punishment is not required if the victim's family has forgiven the perpetrator).
29. QUR'AN, supra note 7, at 4:93; 5 AL-JAZIRI, supra note 20, at 258.
30. QUR'AN, supra note 7, at 4:48.
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punishment or forgiveness. Repentance, however, is an intensely
personal matter between the murderer and God.
In addition to the spiritual rewards of forgiveness, Islamic law
provides another nonspiritual incentive for the victim's family to drop
its demand for qisas. Recognizing the hardship-financial and
otherwise-a whole family suffers when one of its own is prematurely
taken away from its midst, Islamic law gives the victim's family the
substitute right to seek monetary damages instead of qisas. Consequently, the family may forgive the killer and drop its right to qisas.
At that point, it may either demand diyah-monetary damages--or
go further and forgive the payment of diyah as well.3' It is also
possible for the murderer to genuinely repent and pay damages to the
victim.32 If the family accepts such damages, then execution would be
barred. Acceptence of damages is viewed as implicit forgiveness.
By exercising the right to forgive, the family may leave a society
with a recalcitrant unrepentant murderer roaming the streets. This is
a worrisome prospect from the point of view of the public interest.
For this reason, Islamic law gives the state an independent-though
in the view of the majority, a lesser-right to punish, or forgive, the
murderer.33 If the state feels that the forgiven murderer is a menace
to society, it can pursue its own remedies through the laws of
ta'zir-discretionary punishment. The laws of ta'zir aim at protecting
the public order but are not divinely ordained. Thus, they may vary
significantly from one state to another. In the case of the hypothetical at hand, one state may demand a life sentence for the forgiven
murderer, but in another a one-year prison sentence, together with

31. ABU ZAHRAH, supranote 9, at 498; 5 AL-JAZIRI, supra note 20, at 263; 2 AWDAH,
supra note 14, at 176. Some jurists do not recognize the act of accepting diyah instead of
qisas as forgiveness. Rather, they view it as an act of reconciliation. Only when both qisas
and diyah are forgiven are these jurists willing to call the act one of forgiveness. For more
on this point, see 2 AWADAH, supra note 14, at 158-59.
32. Jurists were divided as to the significance of repentance for the ta'zir punishment.

Some worry that a criminal may claim to have repented only to avoid punishment.
Consequently, while the acceptance of diyah bars the qisas punishment, many argue that
the ta'zirpunishment is not barred by it. For more on this, see 1 AWDAH, supra note 14,

at 353-55. See also BAHNASI, CRIMINAL MATTERS, supra note 9, at 132 (arguing that
repentance bars ta'zir punishment).
33. 1 AWDAH, supra note 14, at 245; 2 AWDAH, supra note 14, at 158, 183-84.
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other punishments, may suffice. 4 It all depends on the threat felt by
the community and its views on intentional murder.
The influence of community views on law making is not unique
to Islamic criminal law but reflects the general approach of Islamic
jurisprudence. In accordance with this approach, jurists prefer to
specify a basic set of laws necessary for an orderly and just Muslim
society, and then allow each community to select supplementary laws
according to its own practices and customs. The only requirement
placed upon such supplementary laws is that they do not conflict with
Islamic laws and principles. This approach rests on the explicit
Qur'anic recognition of the importance of cultural diversity and the
jurisprudential recognition of the role of historical development in
such communities, and other similar factors."
In short, murder is viewed as an extremely serious crime that
violates God's laws, societal well-being, and individual human rights.
Consequently, all these parties have a say in the punishment of the
criminal, and no one party's forgiveness impacts the rights of the
other parties.
IV. THE INTERACTION OF THE CONFIDENTIALITY REQUIREMENT
WITH THE LAWS ABOUT KILLING

An imam cannot ignore the rights of any of the parties involved
in a murder. In fact, the imam, like any other Muslim, is obligated to
advance justice in society and to serve the societal maslaha. Consequently, the imam has no standing to forgive the confessing murderer
and is in no position to ignore the crime.
Furthermore, the confidentiality requirement is not absolute. Its
limits are rapidly approached when the act of observing it causes
harm to others in the community. The rationale for this result lies in
the fact that the confidentiality requirement itself was rooted in an
argument for societal maslaha. It is based on a recognition of the
harm and disrespect that befalls those who confide as a result of a

34. 2 AWDAH, supra note 14, at 183-84. It is important to note that while the
punishment is discretionary it is not arbitrary. For more on this point, see 1 AWDAH,
supra note 14, at 148-54.
35. 2 W. AL-ZUHAILI, 'USUL AL-FIQH AL-ISLAMI [FOUNDATIONS OF ISLAMIC
JURISPRUDENCE] 1116-18 (1986); S. MAHMASSANI, FALSAFAT AL-TASHRI' FI AL-ISLAM
[THE PHILOSOPHY OF LEGISLATION IN ISLAM] 200-01,214 (1961); see also al-Hibri, supra
note 3, at 8 (discussing briefly the jurisprudential principle that laws change with time and
place, and its corollary regarding customs).
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breach, as well as the harm that befalls society.3 6 The latter harm

tears at the fabric of society and weakens the bond of brotherhood/sisterhood that keeps it together. Similar considerations have
led scholars to excuse, for example, lies that save an innocent life.37
Muslims view the harm befalling society as a result of a murder
to be significantly greater than that resulting from disclosure of a
confidence. This position is based on the Qur'an itsel which
denounces murder as a major and abhorrent crime. Consequently,
society's maslahais a more primary consideration in our scenario than
that of confidentiality. Where the two conflict, everything else being
equal, societal maslaha wins out. Therefore, the imam has no option
but to advise Jones to confess and to inform the authorities of the
confession if Jones refuses to do so himself.
But suppose that the imam is in a jurisdiction that automatically
executes intentional killers if proven guilty, even in the presence of
extenuating circumstances. Suppose further that the victim's family
has forgiven Jones, so that under Islamic law, he is free to go. Does
the imam now have a greater reason to keep the confidence of Jones?
No. According to some jurists, the state is entitled to execute a
murderer as part of its ta'zir punishment.3 8 Furthermore, under this
particular scenario, there is an additional independent argument in
favor of breaching the confidentiality requirement. There is another
innocent party, Smith, who would lose his valuable life if the truth
about the murder is not revealed.
Since, in the Qur'an, God forbids unjust killings and strongly
advocates the preservation of life, imam Ahmad cannot let Smith be
executed without sharing responsibility for taking away his life. Imam
Ahmad possesses information that could save Smith's life. True,
Smith is a criminal, but he did not commit this murder and should not
be punished unjustly for it. Thus, if imam Ahmad withholds information from the authorities, he would be one of those guilty of the
injustice that has befallen Smith. Society would also suffer because
of this injustice and because an unrecognized killer continues to run
loose in its midst. Thus, observing the confidentiality requirement in
this case leads to very serious repercussions affecting societal maslaha.
There remains one final question. Suppose, under the last scenario, that Smith died of a heart attack while the imam was deliberat36. 3 AL-GHAZALI, supra note 3, at 128.
37. Id. at 134.
38. 2 AWDAH, supra note 14, at 184.
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ing this matter. Thus the killing of an innocent life is no longer a
consideration. Can the imam now abide by the confidentiality
requirement or duty of sitr? The answer remains in the negative.
First, the duty of sitr, as stated earlier, does not apply to such crimes.
Second, assuming that Jones has repented and/or the victim's family
has forgiven him, there is still the matter of Smith's reputation. Even
after his natural death, the fact that Smith was convicted of murder
will continue to impact surviving members of his family in material as
well as nonmaterial ways. The family, therefore, has a right to
Smith's vindication, and the imam has no right to deny them such
vindication.
Finally, Muslims have a duty to abide by the laws of the jurisdiction in which they live-or become conscientious objectors. If
these laws are unfair, they should be changed properly, and not by
taking the law into one's own hands. This suggests that even if Smith
has no surviving family, imam Ahmad still has no right to keep
Jones's confession confidential. Given imam Ahmad's lack of special
spiritual authority, he has no standing to forgive Jones or to preempt
secular law. He still has an obligation to uncover the truth, preferably
by having Jones do it personally.
V. CONCLUSION
The confidentiality requirement in Islam is extremely important,
but is not absolute. It may be overridden in a specific case if
observing it would cause greater harm to society or particular
individuals in it. Murder is viewed in Islam as such a heinous crime
that it would provide sufficient justification for overriding the
confidentiality requirement. The preservation of Smith's life, without
more, would also justify overriding the confidentiality requirement.
Consequently, imam Ahmad has no choice but to inform the
authorities of the crime.
Still, imam Ahmad's role is not limited to that of informing the
authorities. He can do much more. He can show Jones that he really
cares by interceding under American law to achieve the same
forgiveness results advocated under Islamic law. For example, the
imam can be a character witness. He can help the defense gain
insight into Jones and the circumstances of the murder. He can also
talk to Jones and help him see the error of his ways. He can help
collect funds for his defense. All of these actions would be helpful to
Jones while, at the same time, upholding the basic principles of justice
in our society.

